

# CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUNDS

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(Revised document)

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## CLEAN TECHNOLOGY FUND FINANCING PRODUCTS, TERMS AND REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR OPERATIONS

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. This paper establishes: a) the financing products for which the multilateral development banks (MDBs) may deploy CTF resources in private sector operations; b) the expected terms and principles for such financing; c) the procedures to ensure standard of care within the MDBs with respect to the deployment of such resources; d) the procedures for handling investments including problem investments with respect to the deployment of such resources; and, e) the supervision and reporting procedures for such investments.

2. CTF funds are expected to target three types of private sector players: a) project sponsors (eg. developers of clean technologies or large companies implementing new technologies); b) investors in climate mitigating projects (banks, pension and equity funds, insurance companies, etc.); and c) financial intermediaries developing new lines of credit for climate change investments (banks, leasing companies, ESCOs, etc.).

## **II. BARRIERS ADDRESSED THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR INTERVENTIONS**

3. In the private sector, decisions to undertake new investments are based on the risk-return expected from the investment<sup>1</sup>. If the risks are expected to be high, the return on that investment must also be commensurately high if the private sector is to engage in the project. As a result, CTF's direct private sector investments seek to address the risk-return imbalance which occurs in many early market projects and which prevents the scale-up and proliferation of such projects. In all cases the objective of CTF funds is to reduce the barriers for early market entrants such that additional investors, developers and financial intermediaries will subsequently enter the market without additional CTF support. This is typically achieved by a) mitigating risks for several early entrants until a track record can be established which would reduce the risk for later entrants, and/or b) off-setting the incremental costs faced by early entrants (which reduce the return on such projects), but which will not be borne by later entrants. In all cases CTF funds are used to encourage investors to undertake projects they otherwise would not or to fast-track the scale-up of such projects.

4. *High cost of early entrants:* Early entrants often face higher costs than later entrants into the market. Such costs include those resulting from being the first companies to negotiate contracts and establish procedural "precedents" within the sector (e.g., knowing which government and other institutions have authority for which part of the development process – often the "rules of the game" and roles of each authority body are established or clarified as the first projects move through the process). High costs are also the result of more expensive technology inputs that are not yet manufactured at scale and higher debt service costs because investors perceive more risk in projects without a track record. It is envisioned that concessionally priced CTF funds would be used in such cases to off-set some of these costs and encourage developers to enter the market. With scale up of the market, later entrants are expected to face lower technology costs due to production at scale. Cost barriers are typically addressed through lower interest rate loans.

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<sup>1</sup> Note that every investor, developer or financial institutions will perceive different levels of risk for the same project based on their own knowledge and experience of a market or sector.

5. *Risk:* It is important to note that although CTF funds may be used in higher risk investment structures MDBs would not use CTF funds to support investments where there are upfront expected losses in a specific transaction, as doing the latter would lead to market distortions (by supporting unsustainable markets). In sectors where the teams managing CTF funds believe that the real market risks are lower than the market perceives them to be, the teams managing CTF funds would seek to use CTF funds as a risk mitigant to encourage private companies and the MDB's own operations to undertake investments they otherwise would not. Typically risk is addressed through guarantees, first loss instruments, subordinated debt or equity.

### **Examples of private sector barriers:**

- a) Many financial institutions (FI) hesitate to develop energy efficiency or renewable energy financing lines when there is a cost in terms of learning curve and new procedures with no track record on revenue potential and loss performance for such loans. Using CTF funds to absorb the losses that FIs fear would exceed their other typical business lines can give these institutions the comfort needed to undertake the new investment while a track record is being established.
- b) Perceived risk also inhibits investors to finance renewable energy projects in markets where the sector is not yet developed and there is no track record. Generally, if an investor is to assume high risks, the return on those investments must be adequate to compensate for such risks. Many times, however, the expected returns on early entrant renewable energy projects are not high enough to compensate for the lack of track record that exists (in part because of the higher costs that early entrants have to absorb that later entrants don't), even though those same returns may be enough to compensate later entrants for the lower risks that they will later assume (because of a by then established track record). To address the barriers to early entrants, CTF funds could be used to either cushion the risks (through subordination, guarantees or equity gap coverage), off-set the upfront costs (through lower pricing on investments), or both (concessionally priced subordinated instruments or guarantees), as the case requires.
- c) In yet another example, renewable energy developers may hesitate to invest in certain markets if they perceive the credit profile of contract off takers or the structure of a contract to be weak. In such cases, CTF funds could be used to credit enhance, through guarantees, the off taker or contract off take agreement, and enable the investment to happen. Here again, the establishment of a track record would encourage new players into the market as the perceived risk decreases.

6. *Combined Risk and Cost barriers:* The structuring of CTF funds will in principle follow the same principles of risk-return as private funds, i.e., subordinated debt or equity will get commensurately higher returns compared with senior loans in the same transaction. At times, however, CTF funds will need to address a combination of risk and cost barriers in the same transaction. This becomes a challenge in terms of risk/reward because a subordinated loan which addresses risk for an investor may still need to off-set the high costs of being an early

market entrant for the developer (in this example it is important to ensure the risk-return balance is sufficient to entice both parties – the investor and the developer - if the project is to take place). In such cases MDBs may need to price their subordinated instruments at concessional interest rates in order to address both barriers; otherwise, if the subordinated debt were priced at a market interest rate<sup>2</sup> the investment would be decreasing the risk barrier for the investor while increasing the cost barrier for the developer by adding higher debt service costs to the project. MDBs will always seek to price the CTF funded instruments on the least concessional terms possible.

### **III. PRINCIPLES FOR USING CTF FUNDS IN PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTS**

7. CTF funds used in private sector investments will adhere to the principles outlined in paragraph 3 of the *Clean Technology Fund Financing Products, Terms and Review Procedures for Public Sector Operations*, dated April 28, 2009 and approved on May 28, 2009, as amended from time to time.

8. Because each country, sector and project faces a unique set of barriers, CTF financing will not be uniformly offered to all private sector companies. As a result, the following principles for use of CTF funds in private sector investments have been designed to guide the MDBs in structuring private sector investments.

9. *Minimum concessionality:* The pricing and terms of the CTF funds offered to private sector clients will be tailored to address the barriers identified for each case. MDBs will seek to provide the minimum concessionality needed to catalyze projects and programs within a sector. In order to honor this principle, CTF funds will be structured on a case-by-case basis to address the specific barriers identified in each project/program. The amount and terms of CTF funding offered to an individual client will be determined between the MDB and the client on the basis of efficient and effective use of CTF and MDB resources. While an attempt will be made to quantify the additional costs faced by early entrants and compare that with the subsidy element implicit in the financing terms being offered, country, industry and individual company dynamics will impact the amount of concessionality a company will accept in order to undertake a project. Very often three different companies in the same industry will require three different levels of concessionality to implement a given technology. For example, if catalyzing market uptake of waste/heat recovery technologies in a sector were dependent on having the three market leaders implement the equipment, then the MDB would need to offer each company the minimum amount of concessionality required to have that company undertake the investment. If all companies were offered the same concessionality the MDB may over-subsidize some while not providing enough concessionality to engage key companies that are necessary to achieve the program or projects' objectives. Finding the right amount of concessionality<sup>3</sup> is largely a matter of client needs, market conditions and negotiation, and is dependent on information not flowing between the companies or being available in the market. MDB's will always seek the minimum

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<sup>2</sup> It must be noted that in many cases there is no “real” market interest rate because financiers are not providing subordinated debt at any price. In such cases, the MDBs will approximate a market interest rate by adding a “risk premium” to the interest rate being charged on senior debt.

<sup>3</sup> Concessionality (or subsidy element) would be measured as the difference between the (real or hypothetical) market interest rate and the actual interest rate charged on an instrument, times the amount of financing, over the term of the transaction. For example, if a subordinated instrument and senior instrument had the same amount (\$30m), tenor (15 years), and interest rate (8%), but the market rate for the subordinated instrument was 12%, the subsidy would be equal to \$1.23m.

concessionality necessary to enable projects to happen and will justify the amount of concessionality requested in each CTF proposal.

10. *Avoiding distortion and crowding out:* CTF financing will target the CTF related benefits of the projects and will be proportional to the incremental costs of their achievement. CTF funds will not be priced or structured to displace commercial financing or set unsustainable expectations in a market. CTF funds will be used to “crowd in” the private sector by enabling projects and investments to happen that otherwise would not by catalyzing those investments with their concessionality.

11. *Leverage:* CTF funds will seek to catalyze and maximize the amount of MDB and other bilateral financing as well as commercial financing available for its projects and programs. A key feature of the CTF will be its ability to unlock both MDB and other private sector financing for clean technology investments and catalyze ongoing sustainable investments in these sectors beyond the initial CTF investments.

12. *Financial Sustainability:* CTF programs will be developed to maximize the probability of long-term financial sustainability once the CTF funds are no longer available/have been used. Projects and programs should not be approved if they are likely to be dependent on a continuous flow of CTF funds. After taking into account the CTF financing, particular emphasis should be on a project’s or program’s ability to perform profitably under prevailing and projected market conditions. The project or program should at a minimum have the potential to achieve a substantial reduction in the need for subsidies in similar future projects beyond the initial few projects supported by CTF.

13. *Absence of Foreseeable Losses:* *In all cases, the use of CTF funds will be applied prudently in the project’s financial structure, such that the CTF component of the financing is not be expected to experience a foreseeable loss.*

#### **IV. FINANCING PRODUCTS AND TERMS**

14. *Financing Products:* Unlike public sector CTF loans, which are given to governments that in turn structure their investments into projects and programs, CTF investments which go directly into private sector programs or projects through MDBs must give the MDBs the flexibility to structure the project in such a way that the CTF funds can clearly address and overcome the barriers that prevent transformation. For purposes of clarity, CTF funds will not always be subordinated to other lenders or to MDBs. While the MDBs have tried to anticipate the barriers that exist globally, and the types of instruments needed to address them, markets change, barriers change, and the need for financing changes over time. It is therefore essential that MDBs have the flexibility to develop new financial instruments not envisioned in this document if the need arises to achieve the objectives of the CTF. In all cases, the MDB would be responsible for explaining why it believes it can structure and implement the financial instruments proposed in the CTF proposal. See Annex A for some examples of CTF private sector instruments that may be utilized by the MDBs.

15. *CTF subordination to MDB investments:* As noted earlier, subordinated loans or guarantees are sometimes (but not always) needed to mitigate project risks so that an appropriate

risk-return balance can be achieved to catalyze investors to finance climate mitigation projects. Over the years the MDBs have built a significant track record of investments in emerging markets. This experience and market knowledge reduces the risks that MDBs assume in their projects and improves the expected risk-reward balance for such projects. As a result, the MDBs will often undertake projects in emerging markets that other private investors, who lack such knowledge and experience, will not. However, some projects the CTF Trust Fund committee is considering for approval would require the MDBs to go beyond their “business as usual” to finance projects in sectors where there is less track record, and where the returns are less certain. As financial institutions themselves, the MDBs are unable to take risks that are not covered by an appropriate return without threatening their own credit rating and negatively impacting their ability to conduct their regular business operations. CTF funds may therefore be used to enable the MDBs to undertake projects they otherwise would not be able to consider without such funds. CTF funding that is subordinated to an MDB investment mitigates the risk for the MDB and enables it to broaden the scope and scale of the CTF relevant, transformational investments that it can undertake.

16. Climate finance is not necessarily different from any other new market being developed by the MDBs. Typically, the MDBs have expanded into other new markets when there has been a willing party to mitigate the higher risk portion of investments while the MDB is establishing its own track record in the new sector. This has been the case in the expansion into health and education investments where health and education associations (groups that know and understand the risks of their client base best) assume the first losses while the MDBs remain in more senior positions, until confidence can be established in the underlying portfolio’s performance. Guarantees from strong sponsors is another way of achieving the risk coverage needed to venture into new and untested markets. Unfortunately, in climate finance, the risks are much less tested than in other sectors, and to date only donor groups have been willing to provide the risk coverage needed to allow the MDBs to venture into this new product area.

17. Risk mitigation is the primary reason CTF financing may need to be subordinated to an MDB investment; however, not all CTF projects address risk barriers and therefore not all CTF investments would be subordinated to MDB transactions. The transactions most likely to require subordination are first loss and guarantee products for financial institutions (where a lack of track record would not allow the MDB to take on the first loss component themselves<sup>4</sup>), and some direct renewable energy and energy efficiency investments where perceived risk perception is a barrier<sup>5</sup>. CTF financing is not expected to be subordinated to MDB investments when the only barrier being addressed is cost. While the MDBs may not be able to provide the terms necessary to offset such costs from their own account, in such transactions, CTF funds would rank pari passu with the MDB financing. In transactions where the MDBs have become comfortable with the risks of a project while the market has not, and cost is a barrier, both the MDB and CTF could be structured in a subordinated position to other lenders; here, the pricing and repayment terms for the CTF component could be different than the MDB investment but the seniority and security would be pari passu with the MDB. When MDBs seek CTF funds for investments that are subordinated to the MDB’s own investment, MDBs will justify the need for such structures

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<sup>4</sup> Note that the MDBs that have developed a track record of projects which use GEF funds in a first loss position to promote energy efficiency lending through financial institutions, are now beginning to consider sharing some of the first loss risk in similar transactions. Such a “shift in MDB risk appetite” is a demonstration of how establishing a track record can change behavior and lead to sustainability.

<sup>5</sup> These instruments would still be subject to paragraph 12 regarding no foreseeable losses.

in the CTF proposal being submitted for Trust Fund Committee approval. Subordination of CTF funds to MDB funds must be clearly noted in the summary terms section of each CTF proposal.

18. *Pricing and terms:* MDBs will indicate to the Trust Fund Committee in the CTF proposal the range of financing terms for CTF funds that would be offered to clients, including a range for price, tenor, subordination and security, along with a justification for why such terms are required. When CTF proposals are for programs that include heterogeneous investments (eg. for differing technologies or different types of recipients – eg. solar developers and a solar manufacturer) establishing a range of terms may be more difficult. In such cases, the MDB will seek to outline to the Trust Fund Committee in the CTF proposal the possible uses of CTF funds and will in all cases establish a floor price for any CTF investment. The MDB will inform the Trust Fund Committee on the final terms once they have been determined and agreed.

19. *Grants for Advisory Services / Technical Assistance:* In addition to investments, CTF funds may be used for technical assistance / advisory services to address non-financial barriers that prevent market transformation. If such funds are anticipated within a program, the MDB will indicate so in the CTF proposal, including the amount required, the barriers being addressed and how the CTF funds will be used (e.g., for publications, workshops, institutional capacity building, etc.). Advisory services/technical assistance is often required to ensure adequate market capacity, market knowledge, information sharing and a comprehensive approach to transformation. The use of CTF funds for such work must be justified according to its key contribution to the achievement of the transformation objective in the private sector and to the lack of alternative sources of finance.

### **Guidelines for structuring and implementing CTF investments:**

20. Private sector CTF investments will be made in accordance with the investment criteria established in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the CTF Private Sector Operational Guidelines, which were approved on January 12, 2009.

21. Unless otherwise approved by the Trust Fund Committee in the CTF proposal, CTF funds will be allocated by the Trustee to the MDB, and be repayable to the Trustee, in United States Dollars. However, MDBs may denominate individual financing provided by them to the beneficiaries according to their own policies and procedures, subject to the MDB assuming any exchange rate risk<sup>6</sup>.

22. The MDB will, for purposes of each financing, conclude either a separate agreement with the beneficiary of CTF funds, or a single agreement with separate tranches for the CTF and MDB investments.

23. The design and implementation of activities financed with CTF resources will ensure that appropriate environmental and social safeguards arrangements are carried out in accordance with each MDB's policies and procedures.

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<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that not allowing CTF funds to be on-lent in local currencies reduces the flexibility of the funds and increases the costs and complexity of the project, as currency risk must be hedged. It should further be noted that most of the MDBs are prevented by their guidelines to incur such exchange rate risk.

24. Agreements between MDBs and beneficiaries will incorporate provisions for default interest (in addition to regular interest) in the case of a default scenario<sup>7</sup>. The CTF investment will apply the same rate of default interest that the MDB applies for its own investment in the same project.

25. The MDBs will follow their own operational procedures regarding notification of the national government of a proposed financing before Board consideration.

26. Except as otherwise justified and approved in the CTF proposal, where CTF concessional rate loan products are pari passu to a senior MDB loan:

- a) In determining whether any guarantee or security for the CTF loan will be obtained, the MDB will adopt the same approach as the one used for the MDB's own loan;
- b) In respect of negative pledge covenants, the CTF loan will have the benefit of any negative pledge covenant;
- c) In respect of suspension, cancellation and acceleration of CTF loans, the CTF loan agreements will provide for suspension and cancellation provisions and acceleration events like those included in relation to the MDB's own loan unless to do so would negatively impact the objectives to be achieved by the CTF funds, as outlined in the CTF proposal.

27. Where the CTF funds are to be made available for subordinated debt instruments, regardless of their concessionality and relative status compared to the MDB loan:

- a) Senior creditors would not expect a subordinated lender to be able to force acceleration of the project debt where the borrower remains current on the senior creditors' debt;
- b) Senior creditors would expect subordinated lenders to take a subordinated security, if such loan is to be secured; and
- c) Subordinated CTF loans would rank behind senior lenders in any share of recovery proceeds.

28. Similarly, where the MDB proposal relates to a joint MDB and CTF equity investment, with the exception of provisions for return on investment, the MDB will obtain the same terms for the CTF equity investment, and proposed exit provisions, as the MDB's own equity investment, unless to do so would negatively impact the objectives to be achieved by the CTF funds, as outlined in the CTF proposal.

29. Where the MDB proposal relates to a grant component, the grant would not generally be reimbursable except where misused. Potential misuse of the grant components will be assessed under the Results Measurement Framework as approved by the CTF Trust Fund Committee.

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<sup>7</sup> Most MDBs charge a standard rate of 2% for default interest.

## **V. ROLE OF THE CTF TRUST FUND COMMITTEE IN APPROVING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING TERMS**

30. The CTF Trust Fund Committee is responsible for approving the range of terms of outgoing CTF financing as outlined at the time of submission of the CTF proposal by the MDB. Such proposal will include a range of terms expected to be offered on the CTF funds as outlined above, recognizing that program proposals may only be able to identify the types of structures contemplated for the various interventions. The final terms will be notified to the Trust Fund Committee once these have been agreed. If during the implementation of a project, it becomes clear that the terms of the CTF funds should fall outside of the approved terms, the MDB would be required to circulate, on a two week no-objection basis, an amendment to the CTF proposal which outlines the new terms being requested and the justification for the change.

## **VI. SAFEGUARDS FOR USING CTF FUNDS WITHIN THE MDBS**

31. The CTF Trust Fund Committee decided to channel CTF funds through the MDBs to achieve a number of benefits, including: i) the opportunity to leverage and scale-up MDB funding; ii) increasing efficiency and reducing costs by utilizing the MDB's established infrastructure, policies and procedures, and iii) tapping into the MDB's well established network and project development ability. However, MDB management of CTF funds, which are coupled with their own funds, results in a number of perceived and potential conflicts of interest. The MDBs take the responsibility of managing third party funds seriously and have each developed safeguards to manage such conflicts of interest.

## **VII. FINANCING PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS**

### **CTF Approval procedures:**

32. Private sector projects and programs are expected to be approved following the procedures outlined in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the "CTF Private Sector Operational Guidelines" which was approved on January 12, 2009. Proposals will be submitted using the template provided in Annex B titled "CTF Private Sector Proposal template" of this document, and will follow the timeline outlined in Annex B titled "Proposed Private Sector Cycle of Activities" of the "CTF Private Sector Operational Guidelines".

### **Disbursement procedures for private sector CTF investments from the CTF:**

33. MDBs that deal with the private sector undertake certain reputational and at times financial exposure during project financing. MDBs would, for example, lose credibility with their private sector clients (as well as co-lenders) if a CTF investment were not funded upon request due to insufficient cash in the CTF accounts. Therefore, the MDBs may incorporate into their CTF proposals, a specific request for the TFC to approve that the Trustee provide an unconditional letter of commitment which would ring fence available cash for the proposed projects included in the proposal (subject to prior clearance by the TFC/Trustee that such available cash existed). While an actual cash transfer from the Trustee on behalf of the CTF to the MDB for each such project would only take place after approval by the MDB's Board

approval of the project (per Annex B of the CTF Private Sector Operational Guidelines), the unconditional letter of commitment would allow the MDB, the client and co-lenders to enter into negotiations with the comfort that funds would be available at the time of disbursement.

**Procedures for suspension, cancellation and acceleration of outgoing CTF investments:**

34. The MDB will determine, in accordance with its policies and procedures, whether to (a) suspend, cancel or accelerate any CTF investment, (b) declare an event of default, terminate, or exit from, any CTF investment, (c) grant any waiver, or agree to an amendment, to any CTF investment terms, including a waiver or amendment that may result in not taking action under (a) and (b) above, and (d) enforce any security or guarantee provided for any CTF investment, or (e) pursue other remedies available to the MDB. When CTF loans rank pari passu with MDB investments, and the MDB pursues any of the above remedies with respect to its own investment, it will pursue the same remedy with respect to the CTF investment (unless otherwise agreed with the Trust Fund Committee).

35. Similarly, and irrespective of the ranking of the loans, if both the CTF investment and MDB co-financing have not been fully disbursed, suspension or cancellation of disbursement of one would normally result in suspension or cancellation of disbursement of the other unless to do so would negatively impact the objectives to be achieved by the CTF funds, as outlined in the CTF proposal.

36. The MDB will be responsible for returning to the Trustee all interest/returns, including default interest, fees and principal payments on the CTF investments received by it from a borrower/investee. Processing the payment of those interest/returns, including default interest, fees and principal payments plus the MDB investment income will be made in accordance with the Financial Procedures Agreement entered into between the Trustee and the MDB. In any event, any payment defaults or negative returns which are not recovered in respect of or arising under a CTF investment will be borne by the CTF, without recourse to the MDB's own assets, unless such loss is incurred as a result of the MDB's gross negligence or willful misconduct.

37. There will not be any sharing of payment proceeds received by the MDB under the CTF investment and MDB co-financing or any other MDB investments.

**Procedures for handling problem investments:**

38. If there is a payment default by an MDB client, under a CTF investment that continues for 30 calendar days or more, the MDB will promptly report such default to the Trustee, so that the Trustee may promptly report to the Trust Fund Committee. MDBs will consult with the Trust Fund Committee on any anticipated sales which would result in a negative return to the CTF once such losses can reasonably be anticipated<sup>8</sup>.

39. Once a course of action has been determined by the MDB, but in any event within 90 calendar days following a default, the MDB will (a) inform the Trust Fund Committee of its

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<sup>8</sup> It must be noted that exit prices are negotiated and the final sales price in a transaction may only be known shortly in advance of the transaction closing. In any event, the MDBs will make all reasonable efforts to notify the Trust Fund Committee of anticipated losses through the Trustee as soon as losses are anticipated.

proposed course of action (confidentially)<sup>9</sup>, and (b) consult with the contributors on the proposal. The MDB may set a deadline for receiving comments from the contributors. After the consultation with the contributors, the MDB will determine if and what (further) action shall be taken. The MDBs and contributors may agree at any time to have the CTF investment assigned or novated to one or more contributor(s), or a third party agency<sup>10</sup>. If as a result of any action proposed to be taken, the MDB is expected to incur any cost, the MDB will seek approval from the Trust Fund Committee (or such other body as the Trustee Fund Committee may designate)<sup>11</sup> for allocation of the Trust Fund funds to cover such costs. The MDB will then take appropriate action in accordance with its own policies and procedures, but only to the extent that the costs related to the CTF component of the transaction for such actions are borne by the Trust Fund and resources have been allocated to the MDB to fully cover such costs.

40. However, prior consultation with the Trust Fund Committee will not have been needed (i) for any actions commenced by the MDB and (ii) for allocation of resources for any costs incurred in connection with those actions, where the MDB commenced its actions (reasonably and in good faith) either (a) prior to any consultation referred to in paragraph 39 above or (b) during or after any such consultation where the MDB considers that swift action is required, in each case, to protect, defend or secure the CTF investment. In such cases the MDBs will inform the Trust Fund Committee prior to taking such actions on a confidential basis as knowledge of such information by the counterparty could undermine the effectiveness of the MDB's actions. The Trust Fund Committee (or such other body as the Trustee Fund Committee may designate) will allocate the resources to reimburse the MDB for any such costs, upon submission of a request by the MDB showing the cost items/expense list and the particular amounts incurred and the action taken to protect, defend or secure the CTF investment.

### **Procedures for handling recovery proceeds:**

41. The MDBs are responsible for returning to the CTF via the Trustee all proceeds recovered from defaulted investments as will be reflected in the Financial Procedures Agreement.

### **Procedures for amending approved private sector financing terms**

42. As markets change over time, the parameters approved by the Trust Fund Committee may prove difficult to implement, particularly in cases where the floor pricing is close to commercial pricing already available in the market, or where the financing gap requires subordinated or mezzanine finance. In this case and in accordance with paragraph 19 of this document, MDBs will indicate to the Trust Fund Committee in the CTF project or program proposal the range of financing terms maximum concessionality, as well as information about fees, seniority (absolute and relative to MDB financing), security, tenor, and grace period) for

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<sup>9</sup> Bearing in mind the potential effects any disclosure of the proposed actions may have on (i) the bargaining positions of the borrower and the lenders, and (ii) the liability of the MDB to other banks in a syndicate, any information provided by an MDB regarding possible actions will be kept confidential by the Trustee, the Trust Fund Committee and any relevant contributors.

<sup>10</sup> To the extent the agreement cannot be freely assigned by the MDB, the MDB may include in the CTF investment agreement a clause giving the MDB the right to make such assignment.

<sup>11</sup> Per the CTF Sunset clause, paragraphs 53-55 of the CTF Governance Framework document.

CTF funds that would be offered to clients, along with a justification for why such terms are required.

43. If an MDB believes that the floor pricing or other terms approved by the Trust Fund Committee are not flexible enough to meet the needs of a project or the market at the time, the MDB may propose revisions to those terms in the form of an amendment of the CTF proposal which outlines the justification for the changes requested. Such amendment shall be circulated to the Trust Fund Committee, on a confidential basis, on a two week no-objection basis.

### **VIII. PROJECT ADMINISTRATION FEES**

44. Implementation and supervision costs will be determined according to the guidelines outlined in paragraphs 19-22 of the CTF Private Sector Operational Guidelines, approved on January 12, 2009, and will be submitted as part of each CTF proposal.

45. Eligible implementation and supervision costs will be determined in accordance with the policies and procedures of the respective MDBs.

### **IX. SUPERVISION AND REPORTING**

46. Supervision and reporting will be conducted in accordance with paragraph 23 of the CTF Private sector Operational Guidelines, which were approved on January 12, 2009. Measurement criteria for each project will conform to the requirements determined under the Results Measurement Framework as approved by the CTF Trust Fund Committee existing at the time the project was approved. In addition, any MDB using CTF funds in a subordinated position to their own funds must report to the Trust Fund Committee on an annual basis, i) how the additional risk assumed by the CTF investments is delivering additional impact, and ii) the MDB's preparedness to invest on similar terms to the CTF investments in similar future projects.

47. In accordance with the Financial Procedures Agreement executed between each MDB and the Trustee, each MDB will provide the Trustee with certain confidential financial information on the projects within its portfolio. The confidential information will include (i) financial information on each project that is required to facilitate the financial management of the CTF account and is provided on a quarterly basis and (ii) final terms of each project (financial instrument (loan, guarantee, etc), interest rate, tenor, and security/ranking (secured/unsecured, senior/subordinated, etc)) to be provided within 30 days following the project's financial closing. In order to maintain the confidentiality of the information, the Trustee may provide project-specific information relating to the CTF private sector projects only with the prior approval of the relevant MDB concerned, such prior consent to be consistent with the MDB's policy on disclosure of information.

## Annex A

### **Examples of Private Sector Financing Instruments (not comprehensive)**

#### Concessional interest rate loans and loans with performance incentives

1. Concessional interest rate loans are used to off-set the high costs of early market entrants as described earlier.
2. Credit lines and loans with incentive characteristics such as performance bonuses or interest rate reductions provide clients with the incentives to achieve certain milestones or targets established at the onset of the program. These loans are used to fast track the rate of implementation of a program or to direct funding to a sector that otherwise wouldn't get funded. These instruments are most effective with local banks that are comfortable with the risk of a new initiative but that need to incentive either for their clients or loan officers to "kick-start" a new line of business (such as clean energy lending). In this financial structure the donor's funds are coupled with, and leverage, MDB funds to provide the client with one aggregate loan. The bonus or interest rate reduction is deducted from the donor's portion of the loan.
3. *Relevance for climate change:* Concessional interest rate loans can be valuable as a means of encouraging large renewable energy developers to enter new sectors that have high early entrant costs.
4. Loans with incentive features can be used to encourage local banks to develop lending programs for small sized renewable energy and energy efficiency projects; working through local banks is particularly appealing for small sized investments given the scale required to have a climate change impact (in this structure scale is achieved through a local bank's network and client relationships).

#### Subordinated Debt and Mezzanine Finance (to senior debtors which may, or may not include an MDB)

5. Subordinated debt and mezzanine financing, refers to loans that in case of payment defaults or bankruptcy have a lower repayment priority compared to other company or project loans. Subordinated debt strengthens a company/project's equity profile and enables/encourages commercial lenders to provide senior debt financing. Donor funds that are used as subordinated loans effectively leverage senior financing. While this type of debt has some equity characteristics, it is normally repaid on a regular schedule.
6. *Relevance for climate change:* Subordinated debt has high potential for impact. In addition to subordinated loans for large scale renewable energy projects, subordinated debt is being tested with financial institutions who on-lend donor funds along with their own and MDB financing to small renewable projects. The donor funds in such cases are used to fill the 'equity gap' that exists for many small sponsors. In cases where high capital costs and risk perception barriers are being addressed through the use of subordinated debt, concessional rates could also be a structural feature of the product in cost barriers are also trying to be addressed.

## Guarantees and Insurance

7. Guarantees and insurance products enhance the credit worthiness of a transaction because the guarantor agrees it will cover some, or all, of any defaulted payment or repayment per an original contract; guarantees are sought when payment or repayment flows are risky. Guarantees allow MDBs to use their strong credit rating to provide comfort to decision makers that cash flows will take place. This can influence banks and other financiers to provide funding for low carbon technologies (by extending tenors, a project's financial viability becomes more attractive to a sponsor and enables them to make the investment). In general guarantees can be used to cover any of the risks the market will not bare, including credit risk, technology risks, or changes to the project's regulatory environment. Donor funds would be used to provide guarantees for climate change initiatives when no party is willing to pay for such guarantee.

8. *Relevance to climate change:* Guarantees can be applied in different ways to support the development of the renewable energy sector, for example, by enhancing the expected revenue stream from a Power Purchase Agreement, by increasing access to bank finance, or by extending loan tenors and improving the financial viability of a project.

## Risk Sharing

9. Risk Sharing is a way of “sharing” the risk of a portfolio of sub-projects with a local bank or financial institution. While the bank funds the sub-project loans from its own account, MDBs guarantee a portion of the repayments from borrowers if a sub-project defaults. A risk-sharing product gives a bank comfort that their risks are mitigated during the period when they are learning a new line of business and a performance track record is being established for the underlying loans. In this structure, donors play a critical role by covering the losses from the first few defaults (if any) which occur in a portfolio of projects (first loss). To date the experience with risk sharing structures has been positive both in terms of low to no losses and the amount of funding leveraged from financial institutions.

10. *Relevance for Climate Change:* Risk-sharing is an effective way to engage a financial intermediary to lend for sectors such as energy efficiency and small scale renewable energy.

## Equity

11. Equity is a capital investment in a company or project that is not repaid on a fixed schedule. Equity provides unlimited revenue potential if the project is successful, but risks losing part or all of the investment if the project is not successful. Within the CTF context, equity could be needed to support projects that have viable business plans but where sponsors either do not have the financial wherewithal to implement the project alone (senior debtors require varying levels of equity investments depending on the level of risk perceived in a project or market), or because project developers themselves do not want to take the risks to enter a new market. While subordinated debt has some of the risk profile of equity, it is primarily a structure that mitigates risk for senior debtors; equity on the other hand, shares, or encourages developers to undertake risks they otherwise would not.

*Relevance for climate change:* Equity could be used to fast-track development of a renewable energy sector in a country where regulatory changes have just taken place or are anticipated to take place. There is a long development stage for most renewable energy projects and the CTF may wish to fast-track project implementation to achieve its ultimate goal of offsetting GHG emissions. If developers are uncertain about a government's commitment to regulatory change, these developers may hesitate to begin the development stage of projects. If however, an MDB, through its relationship with a government and because of that government's engagement in a CTF program, believes that the regulatory environment will become or remain supportive to the relevant technology, it may wish to use equity as a means to encourage project development sooner than would otherwise happen. The equity in this case would be used to share in the development costs of the project (thereby reducing risks for the developer) but would also share in the upside of the project. For purposes of clarity, it is noted that with many early entrant projects, high costs are also a barrier. As a result, to address the cost barrier, the equity returns may be different (or not) for the project sponsor and the CTF investment. In all cases, the MDB would seek to obtain the least concessional/most advantageous terms for any CTF investment.

## Annex B

### CTF Private Sector Proposal Template

#### **Information to be provided in private sector proposals submitted for approval for CTF funding**

<p><b>To ensure accountability under the programmatic approach used for private sector projects and agreed by the Trust Fund Committee, and also to ensure that useful data is available to the Members of the Trust Fund Committee to allow them to exercise their role with respect to private sector projects, MDBs will report to the Trust Fund Committee, at the financial closing of each project (when details of the project are available), on how each project meets the 10 CTF investment criteria.</b></p>	<p><b>See below - Information to be provided under each criterion.</b></p>
<p><b>1.</b> Potential GHG Emissions Savings: as outlined in paragraphs 9 – 11 of the CTF Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations.</p>	<p>A calculation of expected GHG impact (in terms of tons per CO2 per \$ of CTF) will be provided. Acknowledging the current discrepancy in method across MDB, the CIF Administrative Unit will propose to the Trust Fund Committee a robust methodology to assess the carbon footprint of investments financed, based on best practices around the world.</p>
<p><b>2.</b> Cost-Effectiveness: as outlined in paragraph 11 of the Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations and when relevant paragraph 12 of the CTF Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations.</p>	<p>A calculation of the cost effectiveness will be provided.</p>
<p><b>3.</b> Demonstration Potential at Scale: as outlined in paragraphs 13 - 17 of the CTF Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations.</p>	<p>A description of the demonstration potential at scale will be provided including a qualitative discussion of how the particular project is expected to help influence the market, reduce barriers and/or demonstrate success for others.</p>
<p><b>4.</b> Development Impact: as outlined in paragraphs 18 – 21 of the CTF Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations.</p>	<p>A description of the development impact expected to be achieved by the project will be provided without specific numeric matrices.</p>
<p><b>5.</b> Implementation Potential: the extent to which the current regulatory environment supports, or does not impede, the development of the private sector, and where barriers exist, explain how these will be addressed. Projects and Programs will also adhere to paragraph 25 of the CTF Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations.</p>	<p>A discussion of the implementation potential for the project will be provided and the extent to which the current regulatory environment supports the development of the private sector. Please note this is likely to always be “high” for subprojects that have just completed financial closing with an MDB.</p>
<p><b>6.</b> Additional Costs and Risk Premium: CTF financing will provide a grant element tailored to cover the identifiable additional cost of an investment and/or to address identified perceptions of risk and other nonfinancial barriers. Projects and Programs will also adhere to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the CTF Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations.</p>	<p>MDBs will provide the rationale for the need for the CTF investment in its given amount and structure. Such rationale will include a discussion of how the structure addresses, and is expected to reduce, market barriers. Subsidy amounts offered to individual clients would not be disclosed publicly as it would undermine the ability of MDBs to negotiate minimal concessionality in future transactions. MDBs will however present to the CTF Trust Fund Committee justifications of the range of concessionality (subsidy element) that could be negotiated with the clients.</p>

<p><b>7. Financial Sustainability:</b> the likelihood of long-term financial sustainability of a particular Project or Program once the CTF funds are no longer available/have been used. Projects and Programs should not be approved if they are likely to be dependent on a continuous flow of CTF funds. Particular emphasis should be on a Project's or Program's ability to perform profitably under prevailing and projected market conditions. The CTF subsidy element of the investment should be transparent and provided for limited scope, in terms of project finance component and time. The Project or Program should at a minimum have the potential to achieve a substantial reduction in the need for subsidies in similar future projects beyond the initial few projects supported by CTF.</p>	<p>MDBs will describe the project's expected role in moving the market towards sustainability. This would include a description of the project's role in the overall programmatic approach to market transformation, the impact of the project sponsor in influencing other market players, and a description of the design of the investment projects coupled with the Advisory Service program to address the capacity building and knowledge sharing intended to achieve a substantial reduction in the need for similar subsidies in future projects.</p>
<p><b>8. Effective Utilization of Concessional Finance:</b> adherence to the principals for using concessional funds as outlined in Annex B of CTF Financing Products, Terms and Review Procedures for Private Sector Operations. CTF funds should only be used by the MDB if it is unlikely that the project would go forward as contemplated without CTF resources (additionally).</p>	<p>MDBs will discuss the likelihood of the project being done without CTF support citing, when possible, examples of the market conditions necessary to entice similar projects to be done in other regions and/or the lack of such projects in the absence of CTF type support. In addition, the MDBs will explain how the financial conditions provided by the CTF allowed leveraged other resources.</p>
<p><b>9. Mitigation of Market Distortions:</b> the extent to which the project/program avoids market distortions. Program and Project proposals must discuss how they would seek to minimize or avoid distorting markets, displacing private sector investment or reducing market competitiveness particularly when it is proposed to use funds as grants. Similarly, it will be important to ensure CTF funds are complementary to carbon finance, and it will be necessary to demonstrate that the CTF intervention would not be supporting projects that could otherwise be financed by the Clean Development Mechanism alone.</p>	<p>A discussion of how the project avoids market distortions will be provided.</p>
<p><b>10. Risks:</b> the risks inherent in the project and how these will be mitigated/ addressed. The risks of the Project or Program (including implementation, financial, social and environmental, market transformation, etc.) must be discussed in light of why the project is expected to be successful. Each MDB will adhere to its own social and environmental safeguard policies.</p>	<p>MDBs will outline the market risks faced by the project and how they are being addressed; however, project specific risks which could negatively impact the project's success or reputation if publically disclosed would not be included.</p>
<p>When presenting programs to the Trust Fund Committee, MDBs will provide as much information as possible at the program level, including information on likely project features (sectors, instruments, expected range of concessionality etc.) Trust Fund Committee Members understand that this information represents an indicative expectation and that MDBs should not be bound by this information when negotiating instruments and conditions with potential clients. In case of subordination of CTF loans relative to the MDB loans, the MDBs will provide sufficient rationale, analysis and quantification of the risks associated with the subordinated CTF funds, including</p>	<p>Within the program proposal, MDBs will provide the rationale for if and when they would need to subordinate a CTF investment compared to an MDB investment.</p> <p>MDBs will provide rationale, analysis and the expected risks of any CTF investment which is subordinated. While quantification of such risks would be difficult and arbitrary given the level of uncertainty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. surrounding the likelihood of subordinating a CTF loan to an MDB loan;</li> <li>ii. the amount of any such subordination at the program level; and</li> </ul>

<p>an explanation of what risks, assumptions and caveats have been taken into account in that quantification, and what the process will be for assessing and mitigating those risks. Even if CTF funds are expected to be ranked pari passu, if the proposal requests flexibility to adjust the terms where appropriate (without the need for further approval from the Trust Fund Committee), the same level of justification as when subordination is the most likely option should be provided.</p>	<p>iii. the details of the project sponsor and remaining project structure, MDBs will articulate the elements of risk that would/could impact the risk of the subordinated investment as well as its potential for impacting the CTF investment negatively.</p>
<p>Recognizing that each deal is different, the Trust Fund Committee members may request an oral briefing (either bilaterally or by teleconference) to allow for more detailed discussions and for immediate questions to be raised. This should prevent a lengthy process of detailed comments to which formal responses are required.</p>	<p>MDBs will make themselves available to any TFC member that wishes an oral briefing prior to the close of the approval period of a program proposal.</p>